In his response to the letter from Paul Bernays (with congratulations on the occasion of his 70th anniversary) Zermelo wrote (October 1, 1941 Zermelo had in mind here his works listed below. They concern a foundational program formulated by him with special emphasis put on the infinitary (though always well founded) nature of mathematical proof. This idea is of course in sharp opposition to the (quite well established at that time) common uderstanding of the notion of finitary formal proof. Zermelo rejects what he himself calls Skolemism and the finitary prejudices: the views that set theory should be axiomatized in a first order language (which implies that quantification over propositional functions in the comprehension axiom would be out of question) and that mathematical theories in general should be codified solely in terms of finitary logic.
Zermelo had in mind here his works listed below. They concern a foundational program formulated by him with special emphasis put on the infinitary (though always well founded) nature of mathematical proof. This idea is of course in sharp opposition to the (quite well established at that time) common uderstanding of the notion of finitary formal proof. Zermelo rejects what he himself calls Skolemism and the finitary prejudices: the views that set theory should be axiomatized in a first order language (which implies that quantification over propositional functions in the comprehension axiom would be out of question) and that mathematical theories in general should be codified solely in terms of finitary logic.
In the formulation of his program Zermelo makes an essential use of hierarchies of well founded domains described in his paper 1930. Besides the distinction between closed and open domains this paper brings categorical characterizations of models of set theory (with respect to two numerical parameters -the number of urelements and the ordinal rank of the domain). It contains also an important observation that the hierarchies V κ , where κ is strongly inaccessible, form natural models for set theory (Zermelo works here in set theory with a second order axiom of comprehension, with * Presented at the a version of the replacement axiom, with the axiom of foundation, without the axiom of infinity and without the axiom of choice -the latter is assumed in the metatheory, as a logical principle).
Any mathematical theory is represented, according to Zermelo, by: an infinite domain, a collection of fundamental relations over that domain and a collection of truth partitions of the formulas of this theory (making its axioms true). Formulas may be treated as (well founded!) sets; infinite conjunctions and disjunctions are allowed. Zermelo's notion of proof corresponds, in a sense, to that what is now commonly understood by logical consequence. Incompleteness in his sense is different from that of Gödel. Zermelo believed in decidability of all mathematical problems; however, he was aware that there are systems in which some true Zermelo's sentences have Zermelo's proofs which lie beyond those systems themselves.
At the time when Zermelo originated his program, it had little, if any, chances to be fully developed. The standard of finitary first order logic was winning, due to the achievements of Skolem and Gödel. Two decades later the situation looked different: Tarski, Henkin and Karp started the investigation of infinitary languages and Mostowski introduced generalized quantifiers. In the sixties Lindström developed Mostowski's approach and in the early seventies Barwise proposed and elaborated a whole domain of research in infinitary logic, soft model theory and admissible structures. It seems that the systems of logic based on admissible set theory are the closest counterparts to the original ideas of Zermelo. Also, doch ist die Zeit angekommen. . .
